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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 Scott Lee Mickelsen appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  He also contends that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, by denying his Rule 35 
motion for leniency, and by revoking his probation. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings  
 
 According to the Presentence Report (“PSI”), the underlying facts leading 
to Mickelsen’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine are as follows:  
On 10/26/13 Officer Kelly, of the Idaho Falls Police Department, 
responded to a report of a Burglary.  Melinda Nelson reported that 
someone had been in her apartment.  Officer Kelly located Scott 
Mickelsen in her yard picking up trash.  Scott told her that he had 
left his backpack and sword in her apartment.  The residents of the 
apartment, including Ms. Nelson, all stated that Scott did not have 
permission to be in the apartment.  Scott began yelling profanities 
and resisting arrest.  He was arrested and transported to the 
Bonneville County Jail.  A search of his belongings produced a 
baggie of suspected Marijuana and a baggie of suspected 
Methamphetamine.   
 
(PSI, p.4.)   
 The state charged Mickelsen in with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine).  (R., pp.23-24.)  At his felony arraignment, pursuant to a 
plea agreement with the state, Mickelsen pled guilty to the charge.  (R., pp.27-29, 
31-34; see generally 11/18/13 Tr.)  The plea agreement required the state to 
refrain from filing a persistent violator enhancement, and, “[i]n the event 
[Mickelsen] is accepted into a Problem Solving court, . . . to recommend 
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probation with the special condition of successful completion of a problem solving 
court[.]”  (R., p.31.)  The state was free to argue the terms of the underlying 
sentence imposed by the court.  (Id.)            
 Prior to the sentence hearing, Mickelsen’s application for acceptance into 
the Problem Solving Court was denied.  (R., p.54; 3/3/14 Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6, 
L.10.)  On January 21, 2014, the district court sentenced Mickelsen to a unified 
sentence of seven years with two years fixed, retained jurisdiction over him for up 
to one year, and recommended he be placed in the Therapeutic Community.  (R., 
pp.48-52; 1/21/14 Tr., p.32, L.18 – p.33, L.13.)  Mickelsen filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal.  (R., pp.64-69.) 
 On February 12, 2014, Mickelson filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
(R., pp.53-55), and a Rule 35 Motion requesting leniency (R., pp.56-57).  After 
considering arguments on both motions during the same hearing (see generally 
3/3/14 Tr.), the district court entered orders denying each motion (R., pp.84-86; 
Supp. R., p.20).  On January 22, 2015, the district court entered an order placing 
Mickelsen on probation for three years, and suspended his underlying sentence.  
(Retained Juris. Order of Probation; see 8/12/16 Order Granting Motion to 
Augment the Record.)      
 On April 7, 2016, Mickelsen was arrested on a bench warrant based on 
five probation violation allegations.  (Supp. R., pp.1-14.)  At the “admit or deny” 
hearing, Mickelsen admitted all but one of the allegations.  (Supp. R., pp.28-29; 
4/18/16 Tr., p.6, L.13 – p.8, L.22.)  The district court subsequently entered a 
Judgment and Commitment on Conviction of a Probation Violation, revoking 
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Mickelsen’s probation and ordering that his underlying sentence be executed.  
(Supp. R., pp.68-71.)  Mickelsen also filed a Notice of Appeal from that judgment.  





 Mickelsen phrases the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Mickelsen’s Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
upon Mr. Mickelsen a sentence of seven years, with two 
years fixed, following his plea of guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Mickelsen’s Rule 35 Motion for leniency? 
 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Mickelsen’s probation? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
  
1. Has Mickelsen failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
 
2. Has Mickelsen failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
 
3. Has Mickelsen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his I.C.R. 35 motion? 
 
4. Has Mickelsen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 










Mickelsen Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Post-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
 
A. Introduction 
 Mickelsen contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  A review of the evidence 
presented and application of the correct legal standards, however, demonstrates 
the district court correctly rejected his arguments.  Mickelsen has failed to meet 
his burden of establishing otherwise.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as 
distinguished from arbitrary action.  State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861 P.2d 
51, 53 (1993).  On appeal from the denial of a post-sentencing motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, the appellate court examines the entire record to 
determine whether it is manifestly unjust to preclude the defendant from 
withdrawing a guilty plea.  State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 574, 861 P.2d 
1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 
C. Mickelsen Failed To Establish Any Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing.  State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988).  A court 
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may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only upon a 
satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is 
necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.”  I.C.R. 33(c).  The strictness of the 
standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty plea and to avoid 
encouraging entry of a guilty plea to ascertain the severity of the punishment with 
the ability to withdraw the plea if the sentence is greater than the one expected or 
desired.  State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 445, 767 P.2d 286, 288 (Ct. App. 
1989) (The “strict standard” applicable to Rule 33(c) motions filed after 
sentencing is “justified to ensure that the accused is not encouraged to plead 
guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and then withdraw the plea if the 
sentence is unexpectedly severe.”); Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 
P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982) (“A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as 
a judgment rendered after a full trial on the merits.”).  “If the record indicates the 
trial court followed the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), this is a prima facie showing 
that the plea is voluntary and knowing.”  Detweiler, 115 Idaho at 446, 767 P.2d at 
289.  “The defendant then has the burden of persuasion to demonstrate a 
manifest injustice by establishing that the plea was induced by misapprehension, 
inadvertence or ignorance.”  Id.; see also State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 
208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009).  
In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Mickelsen presented four distinct 
grounds:  (1) he was coerced by his trial counsel into pleading guilty, (2) he pled 
guilty before he received all the discovery in his case, (3) he was not represented 
by conflict free counsel, and (4) he was “not accepted into the Bonneville County 
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Problem Solving Court as contemplated by the plea agreement.”  (R., pp.53-54.)  
At the hearing on Mickelsen’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his attorney 
argued the same four grounds (3/3/14 Tr., p.5, L.6 – p.6, L.10), and, in turn, the 
district court entered an Order on Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (R., pp.84-86), 
denying the motion after considering those grounds.  
On appeal, the only ground Mickelsen relies upon for withdrawing his 
guilty plea that he also presented to the trial court is his assertion that he did not 
have full knowledge of the facts and evidence against him (i.e., “discovery”) when 
he entered his guilty plea.1  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-10.)   
Because it is the only appellate ground that Mickelsen also raised in the 
trial court, his argument that he pled guilty without knowledge of the evidence 
against him is the only ground for withdrawing his plea that is reviewable on 
appeal.  As explained in State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 536, 211 P.3d 775, 
781 (Ct. App. 2008) (fn. omitted): 
During the hearing on Hanslovan’s motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, counsel conceded that the only possible basis for 
withdrawing his plea to the delivery charge was coercion.  By so 
conceding, he waived all other potential grounds to withdraw that 
plea.  Hanslovan’s attorney further conceded that there was no 
evidence in the record to support a claim of coercion.  Despite 
these concessions, Hanslovan raises two additional grounds to 
withdraw his plea to the delivery charge on appeal, and does not 
allege any error in the court’s denial of his motion based on 
coercion.  Generally, issues not raised below will not be considered 
for the first time on appeal.  State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 
824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992).  Since Hanslovan conceded there was 
                                                          
1  Mickelsen cites the following factors for the first time on appeal:  (1) he did not 
have adequate time to talk to counsel, (2) his mental health (suicidal ideation, 
and on medication for mental health), and (3) he appeared “uncertain” at his 
arraignment when he pled guilty due to being medicated.  (See Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.7-10.)  
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no basis to withdraw his plea to the delivery charge, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying this portion of his 
motion. 
 
 In regard to the one reviewable ground for challenging the district court’s 
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Mickelsen contended in the trial 
court that “he plead [sic] guilty before he received all the discovery in this case.”  
(R., p.54.)  At the motion hearing, Mickelsen’s trial counsel explained that 
Mickelsen pled guilty before receiving the lab report verifying what the substance 
seized was, and that Mickelsen “may not have received some of the police 
reports in this case.”  (3/3/14 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-21.)  Toward the end of the motion 
hearing, Mickelsen told the district court: 
[Trial counsel] comes to me with a plea agreement. 
   
 I said, “I ain’t signing that and I ain’t waiving my prelim.” 
 
 And he goes, “Why?” 
 
 And I go, “Because I haven’t got any discovery yet, not one 
piece of discovery.” 
 
 The day of my prelim he brought me the police report, gave 
me about, what, five minutes to look at it, and I waived my prelim.  
But I didn’t want to waive my prelim. 
 
(3/3/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-21.) 
 The district court rejected Mickelsen’s “lack of discovery” ground for 
withdrawing his guilty plea, stating: 
 Defendant next argues that he pleaded guilty “before he 
received all the discovery in this case.”  While this may be true, 
there is no showing how the absence of all the discovery impacted 
his decision to plead guilty, particularly when Defendant clearly 
identified the facts for which he was guilty of the charge. 
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(R., p.84.)  Indeed, when the district court asked Mickelsen what he did which 
makes him guilty of the charge, he explained: 
  I had methamphetamines. I purchased methamphetamines.  
I used them.  They weren’t necessarily caught on me, but the ones 
that they found were mine.  So I’m going to just take responsibility 
for what’s mine and say that I was guilty of it. 
 
(11/18/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-21.)  Mickelsen had, as he stated, reviewed “the police 
report” prior to pleading guilty.  He admitted possession of methamphetamine.  
As the district court stated, Mickelsen did not explain how the absence of any 
discovery such as a lab report caused him to enter an unknowing, unintelligent, 
or involuntary guilty plea.    
 A review of the record shows that Mickelsen entered his guilty plea while 
he understood the proceedings (11/18/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-22) and was aware of 
the potential penalties (id. at p.7, Ls.10-20) and nature of his plea agreement (id. 
at p.7, L.10 – p.8, L.19; p.9, Ls.3-4).  Although he initially said it did “not matter” 
when asked if he felt pressured, he testified he was participating in the plea 
agreement freely and voluntarily.  (Id. at p.9, Ls. 5-14.)  After acknowledging the 
rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, he said he still wanted to plead guilty.  
(Id. at p.9, Ls.15-23; p.10, Ls.14-17).    
 Mickelsen has failed to demonstrate either that his guilty plea was 
constitutionally invalid, or that it constitutes a “manifest injustice” under I.C.R. 
33(c).  He has also failed to demonstrate that the district court acted arbitrarily, as 
opposed to exercising sound judicial judgment, in denying his motion to withdraw 




The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
The district court sentenced Mickelsen to seven years with two years 
fixed, retained jurisdiction over him for up to one year, and recommended he be 
placed in the Therapeutic Community program.  (R., pp.48-52; 1/21/14 Tr., p.32, 
L.18 – p.33, L.13.)  Mickelsen asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing an excessive sentence.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-12.)  He argues 
that he should have received a lesser sentence in light of the following mitigating 
factors:  his mental health conditions of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, for 
which he takes medication, his intravenous use of controlled substances, his 
expressed remorse for his conduct, and his taking responsibility for his acts.  (Id.)  
Mickelsen has failed to establish that his sentence is excessive considering the 
objectives of sentencing, his prior criminal history, and the nature of his crime. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007).  The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion.  Id. 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive.  Id.  To establish that the sentence is excessive, Mickelsen must 
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demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution.  Id. 
 In this case, prior to imposing sentence, the district court reviewed its file, 
which included the presentence report (“PSI”).  (1/21/14 Tr., p.18, Ls.16-17; p.32, 
L.8)  It also expressly referenced the appropriate sentencing factors.  (1/21/14 
Tr., p.32, Ls.8-12.)  A review of the record supports the district court’s sentencing 
determination.  
 The PSI summarized Mickelsen’s criminal history as follows: 
Scott has a lengthy criminal record which includes three prior felony 
convictions.[2]  Scott explained that he was convicted of Grand Theft 
and Forgery as a juvenile.  He stated that he was committed to the 
State of Idaho and was incarcerated from the age of thirteen until 
the age of eighteen. 
 
Scott was convicted of Grand Theft in 1989 and was placed on 
probation.  Scott did poorly on supervision.  He was convicted of 
Forgery in 1991 and was sentenced to a Rider.  Scott did not 
complete his Rider and was sent to prison.  Scott noted that he 
refused parole and was discharged from prison in 1998.  In 2005 he 
was convicted of Escape and was sentenced to a Rider.  He 
completed his Rider and was placed on probation.  Scott did poorly 
on probation and received an Unsatisfactory Discharge in 2008. 
 
Scott also explained that he was convicted of DUI in 2007 and was 
placed on misdemeanor probation.  He noted that he violated his 
probation and his officer, Dustin Parks, offered him the opportunity 
to extend his probation and participate in Mental Health Court.  
Scott stated that he chose to serve the remainder of his sentence in 
jail because he did not want to extend his probation.  ISTARS 
records indicate that Scott was convicted of DUI in 2010.   
 
While in prison Scott received several Disciplinary Offense Reports. 
                                                          
2  A review of the PSI shows that Mickelsen has been convicted of at least 29 
misdemeanor offenses, including property, drug-related, driver’s license, DUI, 
resisting arrest, battery and domestic battery offenses.  (See PSI, pp.5-12.)  
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(PSI, p.13.)   
   In pronouncing Mickelsen’s sentence, the district court said: 
 Factors I consider on a sentencing are protection of society, 
deterrence, punishment for the wrongdoing, and rehabilitation.  
Certainly all of those factors apply in this case.  I look at the prior 
record, which, as pointed out by Counsel, is not a good one.  I 
mean, there’s a lot of charges, a lot of time in the criminal justice 
system.  So that’s problematic in my mind.  That certainly has an 
effect on what appropriate sentence would be for this new felony 
charge.  So those are the things I consider on a sentencing.  
 
 . . . .  
 
 Mr. Mickelsen, I just don’t see you being a candidate for 
probation at this time.  I’m a little -- I guess I would like to see you 
receive treatment.  The ARA is simply not an option in this day and 
age.  It was a while ago but not now.  So I would like to see some 
inpatient treatment, which leads me to retain jurisdiction on the 
condition that you get a Therapeutic Community Rider; and we’ll 
see how you do on that Rider program.      
 
(1/21/14 Tr., p.32, L.9 - p.33, L.5.)   
 The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence.  The mitigating factors Mickelsen cites -- his mental health, 
drug use, remorse, and responsibility for his actions -- were reflected in the 
record the court reviewed before sentencing.  (See generally PSI.)   
 The district court’s unified sentence of seven years with two years fixed, 
and retained jurisdiction with a Therapeutic Community recommendation for 
Mickelsen’s fourth felony conviction was entirely reasonable in light of his felony 
history, failed probations leading to imprisonment, and constant misdemeanor 
offenses.  (See PSI pp.5-13.)  Mickelsen has therefore failed to demonstrate that 




Mickelsen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His I.C.R. 35 Motion 
 
A. Introduction 
Mickelsen asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-14.)  
However, a review of the record reveals that the district court’s original sentence 
was not excessive, even in light of the additional information presented by 
Mickelsen in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of 
the motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  To prevail on appeal, Mickelsen must “show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.   
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying 
 Mickelsen’s I.C.R. 35 Motion 
 
Mickelsen filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence 
approximately two weeks after his judgment of conviction was entered in 2014.  
(R., pp.56-57.)  At a hearing on the motion, Mickelsen’s counsel contended that 
the sentence was excessive considering the nature of the offense, the amount of 
controlled substance involved, and because the court ordered the maximum 
(unified) sentence of seven years.  (3/3/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.18-21.)  Counsel further 
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explained that, “as opposed to maybe times in the past,” Mickelsen was willing to 
do probation, and requested the court suspend Mickelsen’s sentence and place 
him on probation.  (3/3/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-12.)  Toward the end of the hearing, 
Mickelsen told the court that this was his first felony drug conviction, he had just 
“broke up with a girl that [he] had been with for eight years” and turned to drugs 
momentarily, he was older and wiser and did not “want that stuff in [his] life 
anymore,” he now had a job, he was willing to be routinely drug tested, and he 
knew he could succeed on probation.  (3/3/14 Tr., p.15, L.24 – p.16, L.19; p.17, 
Ls.8-10.)   
On April 11, 2016, the district court entered an Order Denying Rule 35 
Motion, noting that, although it had entered a written order denying Mickelsen’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was heard at the same time as his Rule 
35 motion, the court “apparently failed to address the Rule 35 motion.”  (Supp. 
R., p.20.)  The court denied Mickelsen’s Rule 35 motion, stating it had reviewed 
the file and “does not find grounds for altering the sentence given in this matter[.]”  
(Id.)   
 On appeal, Mickelsen cites the same factors he raised below in an attempt 
to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion.  
(See Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-14.)  However, the district court’s determination is 
supported by a review of the record.  First, almost all of the information presented 
by Mickelsen in support of his motion was already before the court at the time of 
sentencing:  (a) he was willing to do probation (PSI, p.20); (b) he and his 
girlfriend of eight years had recently split up (PSI, pp.15, 21); (c) he was now 
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“older,” taking responsibility for his conduct, and “speaking with younger 
individuals in the jail, trying to provide them counsel so that they won’t make 
some of the mistakes that he’s made and the choices that he’s made” (i.e., he is 
“wiser”) (1/21/14 Tr., p.31, Ls.24-25); (d) he would willingly undergo drug 
treatment (1/21/14 Tr., p.25, Ls.24–25; p.32, Ls.3-4); and (e) he had a job at 
“property deeds” [sic] (1/21/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.5-11; p.32, Ls.4-5).   
 The only “new” information provided by Mickelsen at his Rule 35 motion 
hearing was his claim that his split-up from his girlfriend caused him to “turn[] to 
drugs for a minute.”  (3/3/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-4.)  This information did not render the 
district court’s original sentence excessive.  Further, Mickelsen received only two 
years fixed on a unified seven year sentence, and was given a third opportunity 
to prove himself by performing well in the Rider program.  An appellate court 
reviews the whole sentence on appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the 
sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 
144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).  The district court acted well 
within its sentencing discretion in denying Mickelsen’s I.C.R. 35 motion.   
 
IV. 
Mickelsen Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 




 Mickelsen contends that the district court abused its decision by revoking 
his probation.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.14-16.)  A review of the record and 
applicable law reveals that the district court acted well within its discretion in 
revoking Mickelsen’s probation after Mickelsen committed multiple probation 
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violations and was discharged from his substance abuse treatment program.  
Therefore, this Court should affirm the determination of the district court. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992).  “When a 
trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 
600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Revoking Mickelsen’s 
Probation 
 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988).  In determining whether to 
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the 
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.  State v. 
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Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. 
Mickelsen argues that the district court’s decision to revoke his probation 
constituted an abuse of discretion because the court knew when it granted him 
probation that he needed additional treatment -- the type of increased reporting 
and testing that Drug Court would have provided -- if he had been accepted into 
that specialty court.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  Mickelsen’s contention fails. 
Mickelsen’s argument, that, had he been accepted into a specialty court 
such as Drug Court, he would have done well on probation as a result of the 
“increased reporting and testing,” is pure speculation, irrelevant (because he was 
not accepted into Drug Court), and assumes he would have complied with even 
more restrictive conditions of probation when he did not comply with less 
demanding conditions.   
Regardless of how Mickelsen would have fared in Drug Court, he did not 
comply with the terms of his probation.  Mickelsen admitted four violations:  (1) 
he was unsuccessfully discharged from his treatment program for non-
attendance, (2) throughout December 2016 [sic], he “associated with multiple 
individuals whom he knew to be using unlawful drugs[,]” (3) he “used 
Methamphetamine intravenously and Marijuana for ‘most of December[,]’” and 
(4) on March 7, 2016, he “failed to report as directed for a scheduled 
appointment and has not been seen or heard from since[,] . . . is no longer 
residing with his father . . as he reported to his Probation officer and is no longer 
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working at Lindsey Towing as he reported to his probation officer.”  (Supp. R., 
pp.2-3; 4/18/16 Tr., p.6, L.13 – p.8, L.22.) 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Mickelsen was no longer a viable candidate for immediate 
placement in the community through community supervision.  (4/18/16 Tr., p.18, 
Ls.4-13.)  However, the district court gave Mickelsen the option of having 
“another Rider and [to] get another chance at community supervision[,]” which he 
turned down in favor of “just do[ing] the prison time.”  (4/18/16 Tr., p.19, L.20 – p. 
20, L.4.)    
Mickelsen’s criminal history and repeated failures to comply with the 
requirements of community supervision did not entitle him to yet another 
opportunity on probation.  Mickelsen has therefore failed to establish that the 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgments of the 
district court.   
 DATED this 3rd day of November, 2016. 
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